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TAX NOTES
TAXATION OF STOCK TRANSFERS BETWEEN CORPORATE
SHAREHOLDERS AND EMPLOYEES
BELAN K. WAGNER*
This article analyzes the judicial interpretations of "amount
realized" to a shareholder upon transfer of stock to a corporate
employee. The author criticizes the overextension of the Davis
presumption - when properties are exchanged at arms length
their values are approximately equal - to the stock transfer situ-
ation. He concludes that a more appropriate test would be to
examine the nature of the property received to determine whether
the Davis presumption should be applied.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Key employees often desire or demand proprietory interests in
the corporations for which they work. The corporations, the key
employees, and indirectly the shareholders can benefit by the crea-
tion of such interests. A proprietory interest will often encourage an
employee to use due diligence in the performance of his duties,
thereby benefitting the corporation. Concomitantly, the employee
can anticipate potential economic gain resulting either from distri-
butions or from appreciation in value of his stock.
A key employee can acquire shares in the corporation from
either the corporation or from other shareholders. If a corporation
* Former Comment Editor, Pacific Law Journal; LL.M., University of Miami, 1976;
Member of California Bar; Associated with Seaman & Seaman, Sacramento, California.
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issues shares to an employee for services rendered, or those to be
rendered, the tax consequences are fairly straightforward. The cor-
poration will not recognize any gain' and may be entitled to deduct
the fair market value of the stock under section 162.2 The employee
will ordinarily have to recognize the fair market value of the stock
as compensation income.'
However, if a shareholder gratuitously transfers stock to an
employee of the corporation, the tax issues may become quite com-
plex.' The Internal Revenue Service has taken the position that such
a transfer is a nontaxable capital contribution to the corporation.'
As such, the shareholder cannot recognize either gain or loss,' but
can increase his basis in the shares he retains.7 The corporation will
be entitled to deduct the fair market value of the stock as a business
expense' and the transferee-employee will be required to include the
fair market value of the stock as compensation income.
The courts, however, have generally not adopted this character-
ization.'" The opinions emphasize that one of the salient features of
a capital contribution is that the percentage ownership of the corpo-
ration's stock remains the same before and after the transaction."
When a shareholder transfers stock to an employee there is a clear
change in the stock holdings of the corporation. One argument
1. A corporation does not recognize gain or loss upon receipt of money or property in
exchange for its stock. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1032.
2. Rev. Rul. 75, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 52. But the corporation will not be allowed a deduc-
tion when it is merely acting as a conduit for a stock transfer by a majority shareholder to
the employee. Rev. Rul. 369, 1969-2 CUM. BULL. 27.
3. A person who receives stock on other property in return for services performed realizes
income to the extent that the fair market value of the property received exceeds the amount
paid for it, provided the recipient's ownership of such stock or other property is free from
certain restrictions or conditions. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 83; Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1).
4. For a discussion of some of the issues involved in such transfers, see Manwell,
Transfers of Partial Stock Interests to Corporate Employees: A Composite Alternative, 1 J.
CORP. TAX. 275 (1974); O'Brien, Stock Transfers by Shareholders to Outsiders for Nontangi-
ble Consideration, 39 TAXES 675 (1961).
5. See, e.g., Kress v. Stanton, 98 F. Supp. 470 (W.D. Pa. 1951); J.K. Downer, 48 T.C.
86, 90 (1967); George M. Wright, 18 B.T.A. 471 (1929), modified, 47 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1931).
6. Rev. Rul. 291, 1970-1 CUM. BULL. 165.
7. Greer v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1956); Edward Mallinckrodt, Jr., 38
B.T.A. 960 (1938).
8. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a).
9. Id. § 61; see note 3 supra.
10. See, e.g., Kress v. Stanton, 98 F. Supp. 470 (W.D. Pa. 1951); J.K. Downer, 48 T.C.
86 (1967).
11. J. K. Downer, 48 T.C. 86, 92 (1967) and cases cited therein.
[Vol. 31:43
TAXATION OF STOCK TRANSFERS
which has been frequently advanced by taxpayers is that a wholly
gratuitous transfer of stock by a shareholder to an employee does not
constitute a sale or exchange. If this view were to be adopted, then
the shareholder would not be required to recognize any gain which
might have been realized'2 and any loss incurred would be ordi-
nary. 3 Likewise, the courts have not wholeheartedly approved of
this characterization. 4
Most courts have held that a partly or wholly gratuitous trans-
fer from a shareholder to a corporate employee constitutes a taxable
sale or exchange.'" However, the authorities are divided over the
amount realized by the transferor. Some courts have held that any
intangible benefits received by the transferor are so nebulous that
they do not constitute property or that they are so speculative that
they have no fair market value.' 6 Other courts have held that such
benefits are property, and that their fair market value can be ap-
proximated from the value of the property given up.'7 To date, there
has not been a definitive resolution of this issue.
While the courts have disagreed to some extent over the charac-
terization of the transaction, and to a large extent over the amount
realized as a result of the transfer, they are undivided in disallowing
shareholders deductions for the fair market value of the property
transferred under both sections 162 and 212.18 A transfer of stock by
a corporate shareholder, whether or not he is also a corporate officex,
simply is not sufficiently "ordinary" to qualify as a business or
investment expense.
Since the most controversial issue arising from transfers for
stock between shareholders and employees centers around the
amount realized therefrom, this paper will analyze in detail the
judicial authorities which have discussed both sides of this issue. In
12. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1002 provides for recognition of a gain or loss when there
is a "sale or exchange."
13. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 165.
14. J. K. Downer, 48 T.C. 86, 92 (1967) and case cited therein.
15. Henry T. Simonson, 34 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 47 (1975); Harold J. Plumley, 39 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 70,035 (1970); J.K. Downer, 48 T.C. 86 (1967).
16. Scherman v. Helvering, 74 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1935); Kress v. Stanton, 98 F. Supp.
470 (W.D. Pa. 1951); Berner v. United States, 282 F.2d 720 (Ct. CI. 1960); Peabody Coal Co.
v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 845 (Ct. Cl. 1934).
17. Henry T. Simonson, 34 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 47 (1975); Harold J. Plumley, 39 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 70,035 (1970); J. K. Downer, 48 T.C. 86 (1967).
18. See, e.g., Bert B. Rand, 35 T.C. 956 (1961); AIdo R. Balsum Trust, 13 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 1315 (1944).
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addition, a new test for determining the amount realized will be
proposed, and a method for structuring the transaction to minimize
tax liability will be discussed.
II. AMOUNT REALIZED BY A TRANSFEROR-SHAREHOLDER
A. Statutory Framework and Judicial Interpretations
Sections 6111 and 10012o of the Internal Revenue Code jointly
define the basic tax consequences resulting from dealings in prop-
erty. Pursuant to these statutory provisions, a transferor of stock
cannot be taxed unless the transfer constitutes a sale or other dispo-
sition and unless he realizes an amount of property and/or money,
the joint value of which exceeds his adjusted basis in the stock.
Absent a close family or personal relationship between a transferor-
shareholder and a transferee-employee, any transfer of stock be-
tween such parties, whether wholly or partly gratuitous, will usually
constitute a taxable sale.2' Whether the transferor-shareholder will
have realized a particular amount as a result of the transfer is not,
however, so clear.
There are essentially two ways of viewing the issue of whether
the transferor realizes an amount. From an economic standpoint it
seems clear that the transferor has made use of his stock by transfer-
ring it to the employee. This use of the transferor's property would
seem to constitute a realization of the value of the stock. It is there-
fore appealing to argue that the transferor should recognize any gain
19. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 61 provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this sub-title, gross income means all income
from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the following items:
(3) Gains derived from dealings in property.
20. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1001 provides:
(a) Computation of Gain or Loss. - The gain from the sale or other disposition of
property shall be the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted
basis provided in section 1011 for determining gain, and the loss shall be the
excess of the adjusted basis provided in such section for determining loss over the
amount realized.
(b) Amount Realized. - The amount realized from the sale or other disposition of
property shall be the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the
property (other than money) received . . ..
21. United States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960); Tasty Baking Co.
v. United States, 393 F.2d 992 (Ct. Cl. 1968); J. K. Downer, 48 T.C. 86 (1967); Estate of Wills
D. Mood, 39 T.C. 1 (1962).
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or loss attributable to a fluctuation in value from his basis.12 On the
other hand, it is clear that section 1001 measures the gain or loss
resulting from the sale or disposition of property by the amount
realized. The amount realized is defined in terms of the amount of
cash and the fair market value of property received by the taxpayer.
Since the transferor may not be vested with any legal rights as a
result of the transfer, it can be cogently argued that he did not
receive cash or property. Because of these conflicting views, the
courts have been faced with the perplexing problem of analyzing the
tax consequences of a transaction which appears to be a taxable
event but which does not neatly fall within the terms of the statute.
Prior to 1967, the majority of courts which considered this issue
held that any intangible benefits which might flow to the transferor-
shareholder did not constitute property and did not have a reason-
ably ascertainable fair market value. As a result, the transferor
was entitled to a loss measured by the difference between his ad-
justed basis and the amount of cash and the fair market value of
property (other than the intangible benefits stemming from the
services performed by the employee for the corporation) received.23
The clearest articulation of the pre-1967 approach may be
found in Scherman v. Helvering.24 Scherman was one of the original
Book-of-the-Month Club incorporators. To induce a key employee
to accept a position with the corporation, Scherman sold the em-
ployee a portion of his stock for less than cost. Scherman claimed a
loss measured by the difference between his adjusted basis in the
stock transferred and the amount of cash received. The court as-
sumed that Scherman could have enjoined the employee from work-
ing for another employer during the term specified in the employ-
ment contract between the employee and the corporation. 25 The
employee did not otherwise do or promise to do anything in consid-
eration for the stock transfer. The language used by the court in
concluding that Scherman incurred an allowable loss is illustrative
since it focuses on the issue of whether he received any property in
connection with the transfer.
22. See Tasty Baking Co. v. United States, 393 F.2d 992 (Ct. Cl. 1968). See also Hort v.
Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
23. Scherman v. Helvering, 74 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1935); Kress v. Stanton, 98 F. Supp.
470 (W.D. Pa. 1951); Peabody Coal Co. v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 845 (Ct. Cl. 1934).
24. 74 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1935).
25. Id. at 743.
19761
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LA W REVIEW
If [the loss] existed, it was the difference between the "amount
realized" . . . and the "basis" which was the cost of the shares
... . "[T]he amount realized" . . . is defined as "the sum of
any money received plus the fair market value of the property
(other than money) received." The only "property received" was
the right of action against [the employee] . . .. A contract
between a shareholder and the prospective manager of a com-
pany, even if it be property, certainly has nothing that by any
stretch of words can be regarded as a "fair market value" ....
Nor can [the transferor-shareholder] be supposed to have re-
ceived any "property" indirectly as a shareholder of the com-
pany. . . . [Tihe company also contracted with [the em-
ployee]; [the transferor's] shares might rise in value for that
reason, and larger dividends might ensue. But none of these in-
crements in value were present "property"; certainly not the un-
declared dividends, equally not the increase in value of the
shares, until they were sold."6
The thrust of Scherman and its progeny is simple-a transferor-
shareholder suffers a loss when he gratuitously transfers stock to an
employee of the corporation because he does not receive property
having fair market value equal to or greater than his adjusted basis.
In 1967, the Tax Court rejected this line of reasoning in the J K.
Downer 7 decision. In Downer the majority shareholder of a failing
corporation gratuitously transferred stock to a key employee to in-
duce him to remain with the corporation. The shareholder claimed
as a loss the amount of his adjusted basis in the stock. The Service
argued that the shareholder should have offset his basis in the stock
by the amount he realized, and that the amount realized was equal
to the fair market value of the stock at the time of the disposition.
The court adopted the government's position with this cryptic state-
ment:
We further conclude that the measure of such loss is the differ-
ence between petitioner's adjusted basis in the shares and their
fair market value at the time of transfer to [the employee]. ...
To the extent that Peabody Coal Co. v. United States . ...
Berner v. United States, . . . Scherman v. Helvering, . . . and
Kress v. Stanton . . . adopt a contrary approach, their efficacy
has been washed away by the tides of more recent decisions.
26. Id.
27. 48 T.C. 86 (1967).
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United States v. Davis . . . and United States v. General Shoe
Corporation. 2
Since 1967, the Tax Court has consistently applied the Downer rule
to shareholder-employee transfers of stock. 29
The basic distinction between these two lines of cases is that
in Downer the Tax Court presumed that intangible benefits received
by the shareholder-transferor constituted property, the fair market
value of which could be estimated by the fair market value of the
property given up, whereas the Scherman court analyzed the nature
and extent of the rights received by the transferor-shareholder, if
any, and concluded that such rights did not constitute property or
were so ephemeral that they could not be valued. While the
Scherman approach may have been supported by logic and lower
appellate authorities, the Downer court supported its holding with
a citation to the Supreme Court decision of United States v. Davis.30
A careful analysis of that Supreme Court opinion and its progeny
is therefore necessary to determine whether it should control the tax
consequences of a partly or wholly gratuitous transfer of stock by a
shareholder to a corporate employee.
B. The Davis Rule
Davis involved the tax consequences of a divorce settlement
agreement, the terms of which provided for a release of the wife's
inchoate marital rights to the husband's estate as consideration for
his transfer to her of appreciated property. The Service contended
that the husband realized gain measured by the difference between
the fair market value of the stock at the time of the transfer and his
adjusted basis. The Court of Claims heard the case and rejected the
Service's argument." That court reasoned that the fair market value
of the property received could not be estimated from the fair market
value of the property given up because the emotion, tension, and
practical necessities attendant upon a divorce precluded applica-
tion of the willing buyer/willing seller rule.3" Thus, even if the prop-
28. Id. at 94.
29. See, e.g., Henry T. Simonson, 34 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 47 (1975); Harold J. Plumley,
39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 70,035 (1970).
30. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
31. Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
32. For a discussion of the willing buyer/willing seller concept, see Philadelphia Park
Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
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erty received by the husband resulted in economic gain to him, he
could not be taxed because the property either had no fair market
value or the Service had failed to prove its fair market value.33
In a relatively short opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Claims and stated:
[T]he "property received" was the release of the wife's inchoate
marital rights ...
It must be assumed, we think, that the parties acted at arm's
length and that they judged the marital rights to be equal in
value to the property for which they were exchanged. There was
no evidence to the contrary here. Absent a readily ascertainable
value it is accepted practice where property is exchanged to hold
• . . that the values "of the two properties exchanged in an arms-
length transaction are either equal in fact or presumed to be
equal. . . ." To be sure there is much to be said of the argument
that such an assumption is weakened by the emotion, tension and
practical necessities involved in divorce negotiations and the
property settlements arising therefrom. However, once it is recog-
nized that the transfer was a taxable event, it is more consistent
with the general purpose and scheme of the taxing statutes to
make a rough approximation of the gain realized thereby than to
ignore altogether its tax consequences. 4
Two principles can be distilled from the Court's language.
First, when two individuals exchange property pursuant to arm's
length negotiation it can be presumed that the fair market values
of the properties exchanged are approximately equal. Second, once
it has been determined that a transaction is a taxable event, it is
better to estimate the amount realized than let the taxpayer escape
taxation altogether.
Predictably enough, some courts have focused on the second
principle and have readily estimated the amount realized by trans-
ferors from the fair market values of the properties given up.35 Other
courts have been reticent in applying Davis"6 and have stressed that
the Davis rule should be applied only when the fair market value of
33. 287 F.2d at 174-75.
34. 370 U.S. at 72-73.
35. See, e.g., Matthews v. United States, 25 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 70-969 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
36. Some courts have taken the apparently erroneous position that Davis is inapplicable
unless the parties assign a monetary value to the property given up. See e.g., Bankers Trust
Co. v. United States, 518 F.2d 1210 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
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the property received is uncertain, 7 and that the Davis rule is only
a presumption or method of proof which can be overcome by show-
ing that its application to a given state of facts would be arbitrary
and capricious. Seas Shipping Co. v. Commissioner" is representa-
tive of the latter view. There the court stated:
While under the circumstances of this case the Tax Court's
adoption of this method of valuation-the equation of two sides
of a barter-is not clearly erroneous, it is a means which should
be used only under certain limited conditions. The authority for
it comes almost exclusively from cases involving valuation of
property for which there is little or no market . . . . There are
obvious dangers in evaluating the consideration involved in one
side of a barter by determining the worth of the consideration on
the other side. In the first place, the two sides of the barter may,
for various reasons, not be equal in value. Secondly, the barter-
equation method is in the nature of a bootstrap operation since
there is usually no logical reason to start with one side rather than
the other. . . . Thirdly, the evidence on the value of one side of
a barter may be no more reliable than that on the value of the
other side. The determination of value by this means is particu-
larly complex in a case such as this where. . . the seller [receives
an equity interest in the buyer as part of the consideration for the
sale] . . .
The dichotomy between these two lines of cases is apparent. The
courts which readily apply the Davis rule have opted for certainty
even though application of that rule may have the effect of taxing
the appreciation in property as soon as it is sold or otherwise dis-
posed of, without regard to whether the transferor received any
property or cash-an effect which amounts to judicial amendment
of section 1001. On the other hand, courts which analyze the facts
of a particular transaction in determining whether it is an appropri-
ate instance for the application of the Davis rule have decided that
Davis should only be applied when it reflects the economic and
practical realities of the transaction; and when it does not, then
section 1001 requires that another method of evaluation be utilized.
37. See, e.g., Bar L. Ranch Co. v. Phinney, 25 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 70-1234 (5th Cir. 1970).
38. 371 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1967).
39. Id. at 529-30.
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C. When Should Davis Be Applied Under Seas Shipping?
Seas Shipping Co. suggests at least two factors which might
be considered in determining whether Davis should be invoked in
a particular case-whether it can be reasonably supposed that the
properties are in fact equal in value and whether the value of the
property given up is also uncertain. To determine whether the value
of the property received can reasonably be estimated by the value
of the property given up, it is necessary to first identify each right
or benefit accruing to the transferor as a result of the transaction.0
There are essentially three types of intangible benefits or rights
which may inure to a shareholder from a transfer of stock to a
corporate employee: (1) contract rights; (2) future profits; and (3)
tax benefits.
1. CONTRACT RIGHTS
The nature and extent of any contractual obligations resulting
from a transfer of stock are not only dependent upon the terms of
any agreement between the shareholder and the employee, but also
upon governing state law. For example, in Downer no contractual
rights were created between the shareholder and the employee by
virtue of the stock transfer. The shareholder unilaterally decided to
transfer the stock and did not expressly or impliedly impose any
restrictions or conditions upon the employee's ownership of such
stock. Under the laws of most states, the transfer would be consid-
ered a gift. It is easy to envision a situation, however, where the
transferor-shareholder would extract a promise, express or implied,
from the transferee-employee to perform services for the corporation
under specified terms and conditions as a quid pro quo for the stock
transfer." Under such circumstances, the transferor-shareholder
presumably would be vested with all the rights, duties, and privi-
leges of a promisee under the local law governing third party benefi-
ciary contracts.
A transferor-shareholder who is vested with extensive contrac-
tual rights against the transferee-employee as a result of a stock
transfer is in a position similar to that of the corporate employer
who transfers appreciated property in lieu of salary. If a corporate
40. This approach was pursued to some extent in Scherman v. Helvering, 74 F.2d 742
(2d Cir. 1935). See text accompanying notes 24-26 supra.
41. See Scherman v. Helvering, 74 F.2d 742 (2nd Cir. 1935).
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employer transfers appreciated property to an employee in lieu of
salary, it can expect to be directly benefitted by the employee's
services. If the employee breaches his contract with the corporation
before he has fully performed all services due, the corporation will
usually be entitled to recover damages measured by the difference
between the cost of hiring a new employee and the salary it would
have paid to the old,42 or, if the services of the transferee-employee
are unique, the corporation might even be entitled to enjoin the
employee from performing similar work for another employer during
the term specified in the employment contract.43 Similarly, a
transferor-shareholder who conditions the transfer upon the em-
ployee's promise to perform services will be entitled to recover any
measurable damages which he suffers and may be entitled to an
injunction if the employee fails to substantially perform.43. ' Since
the corporation is the direct recipient of this bundle of rights and
since an employer's and an employee's financial interests with re-
spect to salary are usually adverse, it is reasonable to say that the
corporation received an intangible benefit, the value of which can
be measured by the difference between the fair market value of the
property transferred and its adjusted basis.4" Furthermore, the par-
ties' interests are adverse since each is suffering a legal detriment.
It is therefore reasonable to presume that the fair market value of
the property received by the transferor approximates the fair mar-
ket value of the property given up. However, where a transferee-
employee does not incur any additional legal obligations or liabili-
ties, he is not dealing at arm's length with the shareholder-
transferor, and consequently there is less reason to approximate the
value of any intangible benefits received by the transferor by the
value of property transferred. 5
42. See, e.g., Valentine Dolls, Inc. v. McMillan, 25 Misc.2d 551, 202 N.Y.S.2d 620 (Sup.
Ct. 1960).
43. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc. v. Harris, 348 S.W. 2d 37 (Tex. Ct. Civ.
App. 1961).
43.1 See Los Robles Water Co. v. Stoneman, 146 Cal. 203, 79 P. 880 (1905); Allen v.
Chatfield, 34 Cal. App. 785, 168 P. 1149 (1917).
44. Rev. Rul. 181, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 196; see United States v. General Shoe Corp., 282
F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960); International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2nd
Cir. 1943).
45. A basic premise of Davis is that it can be assumed that parties bargaining at arm's
length will exchange properties which are approximately equal in value. Where there is no
bargain between a shareholder and an employee, because the employee incurs no additional
19761
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2. FUTURE PROFITS
Even if no contractual rights are created as a result of the stock
transfer, it is still necessary to determine whether the value of any
future profits which might accrue to the transferor from the em-
ployee's services can reasonably be estimated by the value of the
property given up." The recent decision of Diamond v.
Commissioner47 contains language discussing the valuation of a
profits interest, and in addition, discusses the propriety of presently
taxing such an interest. In Diamond the Tax Court held that a
partner who contributes services to partnership in exchange for a
profits interest could be presently subjected to tax if he has fully
performed all services to be performed and if the profits interest has
a reasonably ascertainable fair market value. If the profits interest
does not have a reasonably aacertainable fair market value, how-
ever, then the service partner can apparently be taxed only upon
actual receipt of profits. In Diamond the Tax Court expressly found
that the profits interest in the income produced by the venture had
a present value which could be readily ascertained."
The Tax Court's finding that Diamond's profits interest had a
reasonably ascertainable fair market value was crucial to that deci-
sion's affirmation on appeal. The Seventh Circuit expressly stated:
legal obligation, it is questionable whether Davis should be applied. But see Matthews v.
United States, 425 F.2d 738 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
It should be noted, however, that while discussing the issue of a sale or exchange, the
Tax Court in Downer stated:
Petitioner does not deny the fact that he transferred his shares to Wootten in the
hope and expectation that the latter would help in the negotiations with Tirey
Ford and would continue to work for the corporation. The shares were the not-
so-hidden persuader to these ends. Moreover, we have found that Wootten either
knew or reasonably should have known that petitioner was so motivated. Admit-
tedly, the benefits might not materialize and admittedly petitioner had no legal
claim on Wootten, but such considerations have not prevented the finding of a
"sale or exchange." United States v. General Shoe Corporation ..... Nor is it
without significance that Wootten did in fact render services for 18 months after
the promise of transfer.
48 T.C. at 92-93 (emphasis added, citations omitted). The Tax Court may decide to use this
ad hoc approach in determining the amount realized by a transferor-shareholder.
46. No court has yet stated that the intangible benefits which are being taxed are future
profits. However, this was intimated by the court in Scherman v. Helvering, 74 F.2d 742 (2d
Cir. 1935), and it was assumed by the author in Manwell, Transfers of Partial Stock Interests
to Corporate Employees: A Composite Alternative, 1 J. CORP. TAX. 275 (1974).
47. 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'g 56 T.C. 530 (1971).
48. See 56 T.C. at 545-47.
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[W]e think it sound policy to defer to the expertise of the Com-
missioner and the Judges of the Tax Court, and to sustain their
decision that the receipt of a profit-share with determinable mar-
ket value is income. 49
In light of Diamond's concern with determining the fair market
value of the profits interest therein transferred, it is surprising that
the Downer court was so willing to approximate the fair market
value of the intangible benefits received by the transferor-
shareholder from the fair market value of the stock given up. If the
Downer rationale were applied to a Diamond set of facts, then the
court would always find that the profits interest had a reasonably
ascertainable fair market value which could be estimated from the
fair market value of the services performed. In addition, automatic
application of the Downer rationale to other sales or exchanges in-
volving profits interests would have the effect of overruling a long
line of cases which have held that a transaction is open if the fair
market value of the property received in the exchange cannot be
ascertained with reasonable certainty."
To be consistent with the reasoning of Diamond, and to avoid
conflict with the "open transaction" cases, courts should examine
the facts and circumstances surrounding the stock transfer to deter-
mine whether the present value of future profits is roughly approxi-
mated by the fair market value of the stock transferred. To do this
courts should first determine the nature of the profits interest to
be taxed and the probability that that profits interest will be real-
ized by the transferor-shareholder. Profits from corporate busi-
ness activity can be realized by a shareholder either through distri-
butions or appreciation in stock value. Realization by the share-
holder of any such profits, without regard to form, is dependent
upon a myriad of factors, including, among other things, the contin-
ued employment of the transferee-employee, the transferee-
employee's earnings record, and the transferor-shareholder's power
to control the dividend policy of the corporation. If the transferee-
employee is not already legally bound to work for the corporation,
then it is clear that any profits expected to be derived from his
services are wholly speculative. If there is no way to measure the
49. 492 F.2d at 291.
50. See, e.g., William A. Cluff, 17 T.C. 225 (1951); Maro Brownfield, 8 B.T.A. 1164
(1927).
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past profits which have accrued, or the future profits which may
accrue as a result of the employee's services, any profits to be de-
rived by the transferor-shareholder are again wholly speculative. If
the transferor-shareholder is not in control of the corporation, then
his right to corporate distributions is dependent upon the discretion
of an independent board of directors. Absent an established divi-
dend policy, a transferor-shareholder who is not in control of the
corporation may never receive any distributions in respect of his
stock, even if the corporation has a surplus which is directly attrib-
utable to the transferee-employee's services.
Before applying the Davis-Downer rationale, a Court should
thus examine each of the ensuing factors to determine if it is reason-
able to apply the Davis presumption: whether the transferor-
shareholder controls the corporation; whether the transferee-
employee has an established earnings record; whether the employee
was obligated to work for the corporation; whether the corporation
had an established dividend policy; and the term of employment of
the transferee-employee. Only by evaluating such factors could the
court conclude that it was reasonable to approximate the fair mar-
ket value of future profits accruing to the transferor-shareholder by
the fair market value of the stock transfered.
3. TAX BENEFITS
The third type of benefit that a transferor-shareholder might
receive as a result of the transfer is a tax benefit. There have been
Revenue Rulings and cases involving employer transfers of appre-
ciated property directly to employees' or to pension or profit shar-
ing trusts. 2 In each instance, the employers deducted as a business
expense the fair market value of the property transferred, and did
not report any gain on the transaction. In each instance, it was held
that the transferor realized an amount equal to the fair market
value of the property transferred. It is not difficult to justify these
holdings by applying concepts grounded in the tax benefit rule. ' :'
51. See Rev. Rul. 181, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 112.
52. See United States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960). International
Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943); Tasty Baking Co. v. United
States, 393 F.2d 992 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
53. The tax benefit rule generally requires the inclusion of items of income which were
expensed in previous years to the extent that they produce a tax benefit when recovered.
Although the issue discussed in the text does not fall squarely within the tax benefit rule, it
seems that the concept could apply.
[Vol. 31:43
TAXATION OF STOCK TRANSFERS
The employer attempted to expense an item he had not previously
included in income. Tax benefit concepts should clearly require
recognition of gain measured by the difference between the fair
market value of the property transferred and its basis. 4
Although the tax benefit concept is appropriate where the
transferor claims a deduction for the fair market value of the prop-
erty transferred, it is not appropriate in the context of shareholder
transfers of stock to corporate employees because the shareholder
cannot take a deduction under sections 162 and 212.15 Consequently,
the transferor-shareholder will not have any tax benefit. Any loss
claimed by the transferor-shareholder on the transaction measured
by the basis in his stock does not result in a tax benefit which
requires the recognition of gain or disallowance of loss. The shares
transferred would be acquired with after-tax dollars and thus a loss
measured by the basis of the property transferred should reflect the
shareholder's economic outlay.
4. UNCERTAIN VALUE OF PROPERTY EXCHANGED
In addition to cautioning against the use of Davis where the
value of property received cannot realistically be considered equal
to the value of the property given up, Seas Shipping also cautioned
against application of the Davis presumption when the property
given up has an uncertain value. The fair market value of the shares
transferred may or may not be difficult to ascertain, depending
upon the nature of the corporation and its capital structure. If the
corporation's stock is publicly traded its shares can be readily val-
ued. If, however, the corporation is closely held, not only would it
be difficult to value all of the outstanding shares as a unit, the
difficulty will be compounded by trying to value a minority interest
transferred to an employee. Furthermore, if the alienation of the
shares is restricted pursuant to securities laws or shareholder agree-
ments, any estimation of the fair market value may well be impossi-
ble.
54. While the court in Tasty Baking Co. v. United States, 393 F.2d 992 (Ct. Cl. 1968),
stated that its decision was not based on tax benefit concepts, the Tax Court in K.C. BeIlows,
36 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 67,199 (1967), expressly relied on tax benefit concepts in requiring
recognition of gain, and the court in United States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9 (6th
Cir. 1960), referred to the taxpayer's claim for a deduction equal to the fair market value of
the property transferred no less than six times.
55. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
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5. RECAPITULATION
From the foregoing analysis three principles can be distilled.
First, where the transferor-shareholder is vested with contractual
rights vis-a-vis the transferee-employee as a result of the stock
transfer, it is reasonable to assume that the fair market value of the
property transferred equals the fair market value of the property
received. Second, where the transferor is not vested with such con-
tractual rights the surrounding facts and circumstances should be
examined before presuming that the fair market value of the prop-
erty received is equal to the fair market value of the property given
up. Third, Davis should not be applied when the property given up
as well as the property received both have very speculative values.
If a transferor-shareholder can demonstrate that he did not receive
any contract rights and that any future profits are too speculative
to value, or that the value of the property given up is speculative,
then the Davis principle should not be applied. In the Tax Court,
the Internal Revenue Service will then have the burden of proving
the value of the intangible benefits received by the transferor-
shareholder, a burden which will be difficult to sustain. " Conse-
quently, the transferor-shareholder should not be required to recog-
nize any gain, and loss should be measured by his basis in the stock
transferred, a result which is consistent with the pre-1967 cases.
However, if Davis is applicable under the particular facts or if the
Service proves an alternative measure of valuation, then any gain
would be recognized and the loss would be the difference between
the basis of the stock and the amount realized.
Even if a transferor-shareholder is required to recognize a gain,
he may nevertheless be entitled to an amortization deduction to the
extent of the gain realized. A shareholder should be so entitled when
the court finds that the property received by him is future profits.
If the transferor-shareholder is not allowed an amortization deduc-
tion, or at least a basis adjustment in his remaining shares, he could
be taxed on the present value of future profits at the time of the
transfer and he will again be taxed on those same profits when.
received.
56. This result would not obtain, however, when the taxpayer litigates in a forum other
than the Tax Court.
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III. PLANNING
The foregoing discussion makes it clear that the authorities are
divided on the tax effect of a transfer of stock to a corporate em-
ployee by a shareholder. Given this state of uncertainty, coupled
with the trend towards defining the amount realized in terms of the
fair market value of the property transferred, the best planning
device may be to advise shareholders against transferring their stock
to employees. In closely held corporations there are alternative
methods of structuring this transaction which may lead to more
favorable tax results with less risk. Before these structures are dis-
cussed, however, it should be recognized that certain tax conse-
quences are inherent in non-gift transfers of stock to employees. The
employee will ordinarily have to include the fair market value of the
stock in his gross income."7 Also, a transferor-shareholder cannot
deduct the fair market value of the stock transferred under either
section 162 or 212.11 Consequently, the only two factors which can
be varied to alter the tax consequences of the transaction are the
deduction to the corporation and the amount realized by the
transferor -shareholder.
One possible structure is suggested by Proposed Internal
Revenue Regulation section 1.83-6(d), which provides:
Where a shareholder of a corporation transfers stock to an em-
ployee of such corporation in consideration of services performed
for the corporation, the transaction shall be considered to be a
contribution of such stock to the capital of such corporation by
the shareholder and a transfer of the stock by the corporation to
the employee.5"
Assuming that this regulation is valid, 0 a transferor-shareholder
57. Section 83 generally requires the inclusion in the employee's gross income of the fair
market value of stock or other property given him by his employer when his rights in the
property become transferable or not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. This is basically
a timing provision for transfers of restricted stock. An employee may not have to report
income in the year of transfer if the stock is restricted or subject to forfeiture. INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 83.
58. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
59. 7 P-H 1976 FED. TAXES 65,325.
60. A regulation may be held invalid if it is enacted after and conflicts with a prior
judicial decision construing the statute. Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365
(1945). In Downer, the court expressly rejected the characterization now embodied in Pro-
posed Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6 insofar as § 1001 is concerned. Whether the Treasury will be
bound by that interpretation in the context of § 83 remains to be seen. One situation in which
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will not be required to recognize gain and will not be permitted to
recognize loss if, and only if, the fictitious transfer of stock to the
corporation is treated as a contribution to which section 351 applies,
or if it is treated as a contribution which does not trigger realization
of gain or loss." The employee to whom the stock is transferred will
recognize income and the corporation will recognize a deduction in
accordance with the provisions of section 83.2 The problems with
this structure are threefold: the transferor-shareholder may still be
required to recognize gain pursuant to Downer; the stock transferred
must be restricted as to alienation and must be subject to a substan-
tial risk of forfeiture; and the transferor-shareholder will not have
received any cash or property outright. Conditioning the employee's
ownership of stock and restricting his power of alienation may not
fulfill the needs of either the employee or the transferor-share-
holder. 3 In such situations, the parties must seek another means by
which to accomplish their goals.
A second possible structure may be increasing the employee's
salary to the extent that he can afford to purchase stock from the
shareholder at its fair market value. If the employee is contractually
obligated, as a condition to payment of the bonus salary, to use
those funds to purchase stock, the Commissioner may of course be
able to attack the transaction as a sham. But if the transferee-
employee is entitled to use the bonus funds as he sees fit, then the
transaction should withstand such attack.
This latter structure will be particularly beneficial when the
corporation is a Subchapter S corporation and the installment
method of reporting gain is elected by the transferor-shareholder.
Then, the employee will be able to defer taxation of the salary
a transferor-shareholder may wish to contest the validity of the Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.83-
6 is when he is claiming a loss.
61. Downer made it clear that some "contributions to capital" may in fact constitute
taxable events. See 48 T.C. at 90.
62. While the applicability of Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(d) is not by its terms limited
to situations where restricted stock is transferred to a corporate employer, it can fairly be
inferred that its applicability is so restricted. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.86-3 is captioned
"Deduction by Employer," and subparagraph (d) is captioned "Special Rules". Every sub-
paragraph under § 1.86-6 explicitly mentions § 83 except for subparagraph (d). Taken to-
gether these facts indicate Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(d) was intended to apply only when
§ 83 applies.
63. In Downer, for example, restricted stock would not have been anywhere near the
incentive that unrestricted stock was. It is hard to imagine a more valueless property interest
than restricted stock of a failing corporation.
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bonuses and the shareholder will be able to defer any gain realized.
Furthermore, every dollar taken out of the corporation as salary and
paid to the transferor-shareholder at capital gains rates decreases
the amount of the constructive dividend which would otherwise
have been reported by shareholders as ordinary income.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Davis case, as interpreted by Downer, has become more
than a method of proving the value of intangible benefits-it has
become a rule of substantive law. If the courts extend Downer to its
logical extreme, then any disposition of appreciated property other
than a gift will result in taxable gain to the transferor without regard
to the nature or extent of any property or benefits received by him.
The courts would then be effectively amending section 1001 by judi-
cial fiat, and would also be overruling the "open-transaction"
cases." Applying the Davis-Downer principles to a case like
Diamond would require the recognition of gain upon a transfer of
virtually any profits interest. Downer should not be given such a
sweeping impact. Rather, the courts should apply the reasoning of
Seas Shipping and examine the nature and characteristics of the
property received by the transferor to determine whether it is rea-
sonable to apply the Davis presumption. Only by so analyzing the
facts of a given case can Downer and Davis be applied consistently
with the "open-transaction" cases and with Diamond.
64. See cases cited note 50 supra.
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